Maple & Bay
Issue 58 min readBy The Editors, Maple & Bay

The bottom line

The Clean Electricity ITC, a 15 percent refundable federal credit projected to support roughly $500 billion of investment by 2035, became law with Bill C-15's royal assent on March 26, 2026. The two conditions originally attached to provincial Crown-corp eligibility (a public net-zero electricity grid commitment by 2035 and a binding ratepayer pass-through with annual reporting) were stripped out in Budget 2025. The federal credit, as enacted, flows to provincial utilities with no climate test and no consumer-side accountability. The likeliest reason the change has drawn so little political attention is that almost everyone affected (Ottawa, provincial premiers, Crown utility CEOs) gets a cleaner outcome from the removal than they did from the gate. The cost is borne by the policy ambition the original conditions were supposed to advance, which is not a constituency that votes.

Strings Cut: How Ottawa Walked Back the Clean Electricity Credit Conditions

The lead: Bill C-15, the gate, and what Budget 2025 quietly removed

Bill C-15 received royal assent on March 26, 2026. Section 127.491 of the Income Tax Act, a 15 percent refundable Clean Electricity Investment Tax Credit available to taxable corporations and to provincial and territorial Crown corporations, is law. The credit applies to qualifying expenditures incurred between April 16, 2024 and December 31, 2034. Eligible property covers wind, solar (photo-voltaic and concentrated), hydro, wave, tidal, nuclear, abated natural gas generation, stationary storage, and interprovincial transmission. The Parliamentary Budget Officer projected the broader Clean Economy ITC suite would support roughly $500 billion of investment over a decade. The Clean Electricity credit is the single largest line within that envelope.

The credit's most consequential design feature, in the original 2024 budget framing, was the conditional gate on Crown-corporation eligibility. Provincial and territorial Crown utilities (the entities that actually own and build most Canadian clean-power infrastructure) could not access the 15 percent credit unless the province met two tests. The first was a public commitment to a net-zero electricity grid by 2035, with a roadmap. The second was a public commitment that the Crown utility would pass on the benefit of the ITC to ratepayers, with annual reporting back to the federal government and a penalty mechanism if it did not.

Budget 2025, the Carney government's first budget, removed both. Crown corporations can access the Clean Electricity ITC without their province committing to a 2035 net-zero grid and without any obligation to pass the credit through to electricity bills. The Canada Infrastructure Bank and the Canada Growth Fund were added as eligible entities in the same budget. The legislative finalization in Bill C-15 carries forward the post-conditions design.

What the conditions were actually doing

The 2035 net-zero grid commitment was the harder of the two tests. Several provincial grids (Quebec, Manitoba, British Columbia, Newfoundland) are already at or near non-emitting by hydroelectric endowment. For them, the commitment was effectively a stamp on a roadmap they could publish anyway. The harder cases were Alberta, Saskatchewan, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, where the grid mix still carries material fossil generation and a 2035 commitment would have forced specific phase-out scheduling.

The ratepayer pass-through was the structural test. Provincial Crown utilities operate under provincially appointed boards and provincial rate regulators. A federal credit that flowed to a Crown utility's balance sheet without a binding consumer-side return would be, in effect, a transfer from federal taxpayers to provincial fiscal capacity. The pass-through condition, with its annual reporting and penalty teeth, was the mechanism that prevented that transfer from becoming a free fiscal lift for the provinces.

Both conditions together were how Ottawa proposed to get something for the credit. The 2035 commitment bought a policy direction; the pass-through bought a consumer benefit; the reporting bought accountability. The structure has a U.S. precedent in the Inflation Reduction Act's domestic content adders and prevailing-wage requirements, both of which are conditions on full credit value rather than gates on eligibility. The Canadian design was tighter on the gate side and looser on the rate side.

Why the conditions came off

Budget 2025's published rationale was that removing the requirements would let Crown corporations access the credit more efficiently, support clean electricity investment, and reduce administrative burden. That is the public reason. The political reasons are layered and worth naming directly.

For Ottawa, the gate created a confrontation with provincial governments that the Carney administration evidently judged was not worth the political cost. A premier refusing to commit to a 2035 net-zero grid would have framed the issue as federal overreach into provincial jurisdiction over electricity. The fight was avoidable. The federation, in 2025-26, has been absorbing tariff anxiety and CUSMA review pressure, and the federal-provincial bandwidth for a separate fight over climate conditionality was thin.

For provincial governments, the gate created two losses. The first was the obvious one: a provincial commitment to 2035 net-zero grid is a binding policy promise that constrains future provincial decisions. The second was less obvious: the ratepayer pass-through would have removed the optionality for provincial governments to use the Crown utility's fiscal benefit for other provincial purposes. With the conditions removed, the credit flows to the Crown utility, the Crown utility's improved economics are absorbed however the province directs, and ratepayers may or may not see any benefit. The optionality reverts to the province.

For Crown utilities, the conditions were operational friction. Annual reporting to a federal authority on how much of an ITC benefit reached ratepayers, with a penalty mechanism, is the kind of compliance burden provincial Crown corporations have spent decades not having to do. Removing the test removes the friction.

The likeliest reason the reversal drew little political attention is that almost every party to it gets a cleaner outcome than they did from the gate. The constituency that loses is the policy ambition the conditions were designed to advance, which is not a voting bloc.

What the credit is, after Budget 2025

The Clean Electricity ITC, post-conditions, is a 15 percent refundable federal subsidy on Canadian clean-power capital expenditure, available to private developers, public utilities, federal Crown agents (CIB, CGF), and provincial Crown corporations regardless of provincial climate posture. That is a significant fiscal commitment. It is also a different kind of commitment than the credit-with-gate would have been.

What it is: a federal contribution to the financing stack of Canadian clean-electricity projects. The 15 percent rate is substantial. The eligibility list is broad. The refundability matters for entities that do not have large federal tax liabilities to absorb the credit, which includes most Crown utilities. CIB and CGF as eligible entities means the federal stake in Canadian clean-power deployment expands further than the credit alone would suggest.

What it is no longer: a federal mechanism for extracting provincial decarbonization commitments. The federalism lever was the gate. The gate is gone. The provincial policy direction on electricity decarbonization (Alberta's 2025 collapse in new wind contracts, Saskatchewan's continued investment in natural gas generation, Atlantic provinces' uneven coal phase-out schedules) is unconstrained by Clean Electricity ITC access.

The Department of Finance's February 13, 2026 consultation on adding domestic content requirements to the Clean Technology and Clean Electricity ITCs is the surviving conditional mechanism. Domestic content rules would tie credit value, not eligibility, to where the underlying equipment is manufactured. If those rules land with teeth, the credit recovers part of its industrial-policy function. If they land soft, the credit becomes a pure deployment subsidy.

What to watch

Three concrete signals will tell you whether the post-conditions credit is delivering scale, or whether the missing gate becomes a binding constraint on the policy goal itself.

The CIB and CGF deployment cadence on Clean Electricity ITC-eligible projects. Both were added as eligible entities in Budget 2025. The Canada Infrastructure Bank's February 2026 Statement of Priorities targets at least $20 billion in clean energy investment at financial close. Whether that target is hit with majority private-developer counterparties or majority Crown-utility counterparties is the read on whether the credit is mobilizing new capital or substituting for capital provincial governments would have deployed anyway.

The domestic content consultation outcome. Comments closed in spring 2026. A binding domestic content schedule modeled on the IRA's adders would partially restore the credit's industrial-policy function. A non-binding "best efforts" framework would not.

Provincial Crown utility ITC claims by jurisdiction. The first cycle of returns claiming the Clean Electricity ITC will be filed in 2027 for the 2026 fiscal year. The provincial distribution of those claims is the cleanest read on which Crown utilities actually had qualifying expenditure in the window, and which did not. Provinces that benefit disproportionately without having committed to a 2035 net-zero grid are the structural read on what the conditions removal cost.

Ottawa designed a credit with a gate, then removed the gate, then enacted the credit. The credit will move money. The question of whether it moves the policy outcome that justified the credit in the first place is the one Budget 2025 made considerably harder to answer.


The brief

Hydro-Québec's $185 billion Action Plan 2035 as the implicit benchmark (Hydro-Québec): At a 15 percent ITC rate, Quebec's projected $155-$185 billion 2035 capital plan implies up to $28 billion of federal credit value flowing to a single provincial Crown utility with no ratepayer pass-through obligation.

Alberta's 2025 zero-wind year as the negative case (The Narwhal): Alberta added no new wind capacity in 2025, down from a peak of more than two gigawatts in 2022; a federal credit carrying the original net-zero grid condition would have been incompatible with the province's policy direction, and the post-conditions credit is not.

CIB's $206 million Mersey River wind farm as the new template (Canada Infrastructure Bank): With CIB added as an eligible Clean Electricity ITC entity in Budget 2025, the Slate / Hamilton Lane / 148.5 MW Mersey deal becomes the institutional template for federally-led clean-power deployment.


By the numbers

15 percent: the Clean Electricity ITC rate, refundable, on qualifying expenditures between April 16, 2024 and December 31, 2034. (Bill C-15, section 127.491 ITA) Refundability matters for entities without large federal tax liabilities, which describes most provincial Crown utilities.

$500 billion: the Parliamentary Budget Officer's projection of investment supported by the broader Clean Economy ITC suite over ten years. (PBO) The Clean Electricity credit is the largest single line in that envelope.

February 13, 2026: the date the Department of Finance launched its public consultation on adding domestic content requirements to the Clean Technology and Clean Electricity ITCs. (Department of Finance Canada) The surviving conditional mechanism on credit value, after the eligibility gate came off.


Worth reading

Worth pairing with Issue #2 on the Canada Strong Fund and Issue #4 on internal trade, which between them set up the federalism and accountability themes this analysis sits inside.

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For informational purposes only. Not financial or investment advice. AI tools assisted with research and drafting; reviewed by a human editor before publication. Full disclaimer.